that voting machines are expensive, that they are unnecessary, that hand-marked paper ballots are vastly cheaper, cleaner, faster, never have to be rebooted, patched, or recalibrated.

But lest you call that fantasy too, let's go back to logic then.

Voting machines can NEVER be secure.
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April 15, 2025 - 22:26 UTC

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Keeping the paper ballots makes it more likely to catch hacked machines, if they are counted.

Of course that means the manual count needs to happen.

WATCH this admin try to confiscate the ballots.
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We can NEVER know for sure that voter intent was captured, transmitted, recorded, and tabulated.

Audits sound great in theory--and are necessary, but when you get down to the details, you see the loopholes in how audits are executed that can be exploited and hedged against.
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I spent years working on open-source voting machines, only to realize that I was barking up the wrong tree.

A) open source voting machines still can't solve the trust problem introduced by computers to elections.
B) open source voting machines will never be market competitive.
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Remarkable in the old “hanging chad” days of 2000 that there could be hundreds / thousands of ballots which had to be analyzed for intent & were borderline.

Some people cannot be counted ON to be clear when voting & had to be interpreted if they could be counted!? That should be a flag in itself.
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You do get checksums to see if the dat was transmitted correctly.
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Early voting (if counted in steps) tend to make it harder to cheat without looking suspicious.

Of course, identifying voters in advance would make gerrymandering so easy.
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